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SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS IN MINNESOTA
By CHARLES BUNN*
EAN FRASER has so fully and carefully set forth the numerous
absurdities of the Minnesota law of restraints and perpetui-
ties as it relates to trusts' that it ought to be unnecessary to go
over the same ground. But the Dean's good seed has fallen on
singularly barren soil.' In the eight years since the publication of
his papers there has been no important- legislation except the ex-
cellent new statute on charitable trusts,2 and in the field of case
law the principal decision does not refer either to the clear state-
ment of the Dean or the apparently applicable statutes, and reaches
a result in some respects more extreme than in any other jurisdic-
tion.3 It seems to be necessary that someone plow some of the
same ground again. What is here attempted is limited to part of
the one field of spendthrift trusts.
By a spendthrift trust is meant, in the words of the American
Law Institute, one "in which by the terms of the trust a valid
restraint on the voluntary and involuntary transfer of the interest
of the beneficiary is imposed."14
Several assumptions underly this definition. The first and
most important is that in general, unless restrained, the interest
*Of the St. Paul, Minnesota Bar.
'The Rules against Restraints on Alienation, and against Suspension
of the Absolute Power of Alienation in Minnesota, (1924) 8 MINNESOTA
LAW RETIEW 185, 192-199; (1925) 9 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEw 314-352.
-Minnesota, Laws 1927, ch. 180; Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 8090-1
to 8090-4. See Dwan, Minnesota's Statute of Charitable Trusts, (1930)
14 MINNESOTA LAw REvIEv 587.3The case refcrred to is First National Bank of Canby v. Olufson,(1930) 181 Minn. 289, 232 N. W. 337. The decision was competently noted
at the time in this review. (1931) 15 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 570-581.
The importance of the questions involved, and the fact that this seems to
be the only Minnesota decision directly on the subject, seems to justify this
further treatment. Cf. however, Erickson v. Erickson, (1930) 181 Minn.
421, 423, 237 N. W. 793.4American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Trusts, Tenta-
tive Draft No. 2, sec. 148 (2).
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of the beneficiary of a trust is capable both of voluntary and in-
voluntary transfer. This is of course subject to the nature of
the interest. If one has a right to have his education paid
for, or to occupy a certain room rent free, he cannot, in the nature
of the thing, usefully assign his right to anyone else, nor is it of
value to his creditors. But most forms of property can be as-
signed, and tlhe owner's creditors can reach them. The present
proposition merely is that it makes no difference, to assignability
or availability to creditors, that the property in question is an inter-
est'in a trust rather than an ordinary legal title. It is believed this
is law everywhere, including Minnesota,5 except as modified by
certain statutes hereafter to be noticed.
The second assumption of the definition is that, in general, re-
straints on voluntary and involuntary transfers go together; that
is, if a man can transfer a trust in;erest his creditors can reach
it, aid vice versa. Thi is undoubtedly the general rule, just as
with other forms of property.6 - In Minnesota, because of the stat-
5American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Trusts, Tentative
Draft No. 2, secs. 128, 138-143; Gray, Restraints on Alienation, 2d ed..
secs. 1-10, 143-149, 256; Bogert, Trusts 433; Perry, Trusts, 7th ed., sec.
827a; 26 R. C. L. 1264; Croxall v. Sherrend, (1866) 5 Wall. (U.S.) 268,
18 L. Ed. 572. In Simmons v. Northwestern Company; (1917) 136 Minn.
357, 360, 162 N. W. 450, the court said:
"There can be no serious doubt of her right of alienation/not only of
the corpus of the estate, but also the income, since the will contains noth-
ing inconsistent with the exercise of such right." In Jacobson v. Mankato
Loan & Trust Co., (Minn. March 2, 1934) the court said: "And where the
right and interest has vested in the beneficiary on becoming of age, he
may assign or dispose of such interest by will or otherwise, even though
possession and enjoyment be postponed." Some language in Estate
of Thorne, (1920) 145 Minn. 412,417, 177 N. W. 68, apparently tending in the
opposite direction, is adequately disposed of by Deai Fraser. See (1924) 8
MINNESorrA LAW REviEw 185, 199, note 73. A vested interest in trust is
subject to garnishment in Minnesota. National Surety Co. v. Hurley,
(1915) 130 Minn. 392, 153 N. W. 740.
GAmerican Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Trusts, Tenta-
tive Draft No. 2, Explanatory notes to sec. 148, Comment C, and cases
cited. National Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 70 (a) (5), 11 U. S. C. A., sec. 110
(a) (5), 1 Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 11, sec. 110 (a) (5) ; 2 Collier, Bank-
ruptcy, 13th ed., pp. 1657-9, 1686-8; Pollack v. Meyer Bros. Drug Co..
(C.C.A. 8th Cir., 1916) 233 Fed. 861. The "caveat" on this point in the
text of sec. 148 of the American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law
of Trusts, Tentative Draft No. 2, obviously results from the decisions in
Boston Safe Deposit Co. v. Luke, (1915) 220 Mass. 484, 108 N. E. 64;
Eaton v. Boston Safe Deposit Co., (1916) 240 U. S. 427, 36 Sup. Ct. 391.
60 L. Ed. 723. Those decisions are really strong confirmation of the doc-
trine. In order to sustain the Massachusetts result (that the interest did
not pass to the trustee in bankruptcy) the Supreme Court found it neces-
sary substantially to overrule the Massachusetts dictum that the interest
was assignable. Otherwise "there would be difficulty in admitting that a
person could have property over which he could exercise all the powers of
ownership except to make it liable for his debts."
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utes mentioned7 some trust interests in land, although not sub-
ject to voluntary transfer, may be reached in part by creditors; but
it is believed that here, as elsewhere, property which a man can
both enjoy and transfer is necessarily subject to be taken for his
debts.
The definition furthermore assumes, or rather states directly,
that the restraint must be "by the terms of the trust." If the in-
strument is silent there is no restraint, and outside testimony is
not admissible to prove an unexpressed intention.8 This rule is
really part of the first proposition.' It is because interests in trusts
are assignable unless restrained that restraint is necessary to pre-
vent assignability; and the proper place to impose restraints is
obviously in the instrument. It is perhaps because they have for-
gotten the first rule that several courts have found restraints in-
tended on very inconclusive language.9
The definition further states that to make a spendthrift trust
the restraint imposed must be "valid." This assumes that some
restraints may be invalid. It is here that the battleground has
been for fifty years. Will the law permit a competent adult to
own a right to income or to corpus which he cannot sell and which
his creditors cannot reach? If so, to what extent and within what
limitations? These were the subjects which John Chipman Gray
debated with the Supreme Court of the United States and on
which courts and legislatures have differed from each other ever
since.""
7Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., secs. 8098, 8092.
"American's Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Trusts, Tenta-
tive Draft No. 2, sec. 148, Comment D. In Simmons v. Northwestern
Trust Co., (1917) 136 Minn. 357, 360, 162 N. W. 450, the court declined
to pass on the question whether parol evidence could be received as to
the purpose of the trust and the settlor's desire to permit it to be terminated
in certain circumstances.
9The cases are collected in the prior comment on the Olufson Case,
(1931) 15 MINNESOTA LAW REviEW 570, 579-80, notes 49-52. Short and
appropriate methods for the expression of the intention are given (if neces-
sary) in the American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Trusts,
Tentative Draft No. 2, sec. 148, comment c, and illustrations. These
forms have a long and interesting history, which has been readily avail-
able to lawyers for almost forty years. See Gray, Restraints on Aliena-
tion, 2nd ed., passim. By this time anyone who really wants to restrain as-
signment or involuntary transfer of trust interests ought to be able some-
how to express that purpose.
1OBroadway National Bank v. Adams, (1882) 133 Mass. 170; Tilling-
hast v. Bradford, (1858) 5 R. I. 205; Nichols v. Eaton, (1875) 91 U. S.
716; 23 L. Ed. 254; Gray, Restraints on Alienation, 2nd ed.; Fraser, The
Rules Against Restraints on Alienation, and against Suspension of the
Absolute Power of Alienation in Minnesota, (1924) 8 MIn'TaSGA LAW
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The view ultimately taken by a majority of American courts
was that if the beneficiary's sole right was to income from the
trust, for life or for a term of years, provisions that his right
should not be transferable by him and should not be subject to
the claims of creditors were valid,"' but if his interest was an
equitable fee, subject to someone else's life estate, he could sell
it and his creditors could reach it, and provisions to the contrary
were void.12  Prior to 1930 the supreme court of Minnesota had
not passed upon these questions, and no one knew whether a valid
spendthrift trust could be set up in the state or not.1' : The best
practice therefore was. when a settlor or testator wished a trust set
up with spendthrift clauses, to insert appropriate provisions, and
then go on to provide that in case of bankruptcy. assignment, or
an attempt to levy on the interest, the right of the beneficiary
should absolutely cease, and the trustee should proceed, in his
absolute discretion, to apply so much of the income as he deemed
wise to the support of the beneficiary or of other persons named
(commonly the wife or children of the beneficiary). Counsel
thus hoped that if the direct restraining clauses were held void a
somewhat similar result might be accomplished by the forfeiture.
followed by discretionary application of income to support."
This was, however, not entirely the whole story. There had
been in force since 1851 two statutes, now Mason's Statutes of
1927, sections 8098 and 8092.'
REviw 185, 194-199. The numerous other decisions and statutes are col-
lected in the American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Trusts,
Tentative Draft No. 2, explanatory notes to-secs. 147, 148, 149.
"iAmerican Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Trusts, Tentative
Draft No. 2, sec. 148 and explanatory notes; Fraser, Rules against Re-
straints on Alienation, and against Suspension of the Absolute Power of
Alienation in Minnesota, (1924) 8 MINNESOTA LAw REvIEW 185, 194-199.
S2American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Trusts, Tenta-
tive Draft No. 2, sec. 147 and explanatory notes. For various refinements
see Griswold, Reaching the Interest of the Beneficiary of a Spendthrift
Trust, (1929) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 63; Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts Created
in Whole or in Part for the Benefit of the Beneficiary, (1930) 44 Harv.
L. Rev. 203; American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Trusts,
Tentative Draft No. 2, secs. 152-155.
"Dean Fraser stated the problem fully in 1924. See (1924) 8 Mir-
NESOTA LAw REvIEW 185, 194-199.
14See American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Trusts,
Tentative Draft No. 2, secs. 146, 150, 151, 157 and explanatory notes.
'
2 Minn., Revised Statutes ot the Territory 1851, Ch. 44, sec. 19, 13;
Public Statutes, 1849-58, (Sherburne & Hollinshead) Ch. 32, sec. 19, 13;
G. S. 1866, Ch. 43, sec. 19, 13; St. at L., 1873, (Bissell) Ch. 32, sec. 65,
59: G. S. 1878, Ch. 43, sec. 19, 13; G. S. 1891 (Kelly) Ch. 52, seci 4020,
-4019; G. S. 1894, sec. 4292, 4286; R. L. 1905, Ch. 60, sec. 3257, 3251; G.
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Section 8098 provides:
"No person beneficially interested in a trust for the receipt of
rents and profits of the lands can assign, or in any manner dispose
of, such interest; but the rights and interest of every person for
whose benefit a trust for the payment of a sum in gross is created
are assignable."
Various perplexing questions are apparent on inspection of
this section. What was "a trust for the receipt of the rents
and profits of the lands ?" Did it include, for instance, a trust of
real estate under which net income (or a stated annuity from
income) was payable to A for life, remainder to another? In
New York, where the section originated, it was held it did,", but
not in Minnesota. Our court had said distinctly that a trust simply
to pay income was not within the section, but that "it applies only
to trusts to receive and apply to specific purposes the rents and
profits of land."' 7  Few trusts would come within this definition,
and the section has accordingly apparently never been applied.
What then was the other sort of trust mentioned in the section,
one that is "for the payment of a sum in gross?" Was an annuity
a sum in gross, or must it be a single sum, or what? There were
no decisions in Minnesota° on the subject, but in New York it had
been held that the words meant "a single sum, payable at one time
or in installments, but not periodical sums given as annuities are
usually given, for permanent maintenance.""'
It therefore seemed clear that the two classifications of the sec-
S. 1913, sec. 6718, 6712; G. S. 1923, sec. 8098, 8092.
The sections, like most of our chapter about trusts, came from the New
York code of 1848, via Michigan and Wisconsin. Similar provisions are
still in force elsewhere, as follows:
Statutes like Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 8098:
Michigan, Comp. Laws, 1915, sec. 11583; Montana, Rev. Codes, 1921,
sec. 6794; New York, Real Prop,. Law 1918, sec. 103; New York, Per-
sonal Prop. Law 1918, sec. 15; Wisconsin, Statutes 1929, sec. 231.19.
Statutes like Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 8092:
California, Civil Code, sec. 859; Connecticut, Gen. Stats. 1930, sec.
5723; Michigan, Comp. Laws 1915, sec. 11577; Montana, Rev. Codes,
1921, sec. 6788; New York, Real Prop. Law 1918, sec. 98; North Dakota,
Comp. Laws 1913, sec. 5369; Oklahoma, Comp. Stat. Ann., 1921, sec. 8470;
South Dakota, Comp. Laws 1929, sec. 376; Wisconsin Statutes 1929, sec.
231.13.l6Cochrane v. Schell, (1894) 140 N. Y. 516, 35 N. E. 971; Gray, Re-
straints on Alienation, 2nd ed., Appendix 1, sec. 295.17Simmons v. Northwestern Trust Co., (1917) 136 Minn. 357, 361,
162 N. W. 450. This and other problems under the section were treated
by Dean Fraser in 1925. See (1925) 9 MIfNEsoTA LAW REv Ew 314,
345-350. They are further discussed in (1931) 15 MINNFsOTA LAW RE-
VEW 570-581.
"Cochrane v. Schell, (1894) 140 N. Y. 516, 534-5, 35 N. E. 971.
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tion did not cover the whole field. In particular, the very com-
mon form of private trust to pay net income to a wife for life,
remainder to a child or children, was excluded from the first class
by the definition of the Simmons Case, and was riot within the
second. And the section apparently applied only to trusts of
land, so that all trusts of securities, etc., were equally excluded."0
The great majority of all existing private trusts were therefore
not within the section but were governed by the common law.
The other statute is now Mason's Statutes of 1927, section
8092. It reads:
"When a'trust is created to receive the rents and profits of
lands, and no valid direction for accumulation is given, the surplus
of such rents and profits, beyond the sum necessary for the edu-
cation and support of the person for whose benefit the trust is
created, shall be subject in equity to the claims of his creditors, in
the same manner as other personal property which cannot be
reached by an execution at law."
This section apparently had never becn referred to by the
Minnesota court. It was on its face as full of puzzles as the
other. A trust "created to receive the rents and profits of lands"
might cover any trust of real estate. So read, the section was
unnecessary, for the general propositibn was that interests in
trusts were reachable by creditors like other property. If the
meaning of the section was that "the sum necessary for the educa-
tion and support of the person for whose benefit the trust is
created" should not be reached by creditors (and it obviously had
that meaning, incidentally), then a very backhanded way had been
taken to say a very simple thing. Some other explanation of the
section must be found.
The explanation lay in the fact that this was thE companion to
section 8098. The two came from the same source, and were en-
acted together as part of the same code.20 They were to be read to-
gether, and completed each other. They were consistent with a legis-
'
0 While this has never been definitely held in Minnesota, I think it
is clearly the right view. The opposite result in New York (based in part
on other sections of the- code which Minnesota did not copy), and the con-
flicting results in Michigan and Wisconsin, are discussed in the note at
(1931) 15 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 570, 574-5. There are many differ-
ences between trusts of real estate and personal property in Minnesota (see
Dean Fraser's paper, (1925) 9 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 314, 327-351),
and I can see no reason for saying that this section, which on its face
applies to land and to land only, was intended to cover also stocks and
hrnds. This conclusion is reached also by the writer of the note in (1931)
15 MI'rzNNEsoTA LAW REVIEW 570, 578.2 See footnote 15.
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lative understanding that in general interests in trusts were ass:gn-
able and could be reached by creditors, and also that in general as-
signable interests were subject to the claims of creditors and non-
assignable interests were not. They changed both of those rules
for a single sort of trust, so that the interests in question, although
not assignable, were subject to claims of creditors to the extent
provided. The statutory rules apparently were final in the cases
which they covered. and could not be changed by language in the
instrument pr by the purpose -of the creator of the trust. But
they covered only certain cases.
It followed that the sorts of trusts within the second section
(8092) were the same as those within the first provision of the
first (8098), and that the restrictive definition of the Simmons
Case'- applied to both. It followed also that all other sorts of
trusts were governed by the common law.
This was apparently the situation as it stood in 1930. It was,
however, not a picture that counsel could be sure of. The reading
of the two sections, so much more restrictive of their meaning
than that adopted where they came from, depended on one sen-
tence in the Simmons Case, and could hardly be called settled.
And in all the trusts not covered by the sections, and depending
on the common law, no one could tell whether spendthrift clauses
were legitimate or not. All that seemed certain was that the sec-
tions covered something, that what they covered they controlled,
and that interests in other trusts could be assigned or reached by
creditors unless validly restrained.
In this situation First National Bank of Canby v. Ohfson2 -
came up for decision. Thrond Syverson had died, leaving a will
by which he bequeathed the residue of his estate as follows:
"'An undivided one-third part thereof and interest therein to
Sina Kopperud.
An undivided one-third part thereof and interest therein to
Arna Kopperud.
An undivided one-third part thereof and interest therein to
Christian Kopperud, in trust for Minda Olufson, for the follow-
ing uses and purposes: a. Said trusteeship shall continue as long
as John Olufson lives or as long as he is the husband of said
Minda Olufson. b. Said trustee shall annually pay to-said Minda
Olufson the net income from her share. c. Said trustee shall hold
and manage said share and property as a trust fund, and shall
,
1See footnote 17.
2(1930) 181 Minn. 289. 232 N. W. 337.
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have full authority and is hereby empowered to sell land, mort-
gage land, reinvest, and do any and all th:ngs with reference to
said property in his hands as such trustee as he shall consider to
be for the best interests of said trust and of said Minda Olufson.
Said trusteeship shall terminate in the event that said Minda Oluf-
son dies before John Olufson and while his wife."
The final decree of the probate court had been entered, and had
copied the language of the will without interpretation or enlarge-
nient. The present action was by a judgment creditor of Minda
Glufson, to construe the probate decree and to subject the interest
of Minda in the trust, by sale, to the satisfaction of the plaintiff's
judgment. The trust included both personal property and land.
Upon this state of facts four questions were involved, that is:
First: \What were the interests of Minda Olufson under the
will and decree?
Second: WN]ere those interests subject to the statutes we have
mentioned? (To the extent, if any, that they were, they were
not assignable, but subject in part to claims of creditors, and the
testator's intent was immaterial.)
Third: To the extent that the statutes were not applicable, did
the will show any intention to restrain assignment of her interests
by Minda, or to restrain her creditors from reaching them? (Un-
less it did Minda could assign her interests, and her creditors could
reach then.)
Fourth: If such an intention was disclosed, was the restraint
provided one that the law should recognize, or should it be disre-
garded as illegal? In other words, were spendthrift trusts to be
held valid in Minnesota, and if so to what extent?
The court's opinion considers the first question briefly,- disre-
gards the second, -assumes an answer to the third, and spends
itself fully on the last of all. To make clear what has occurred,
it is nevertheless necessary to consider all' the questions, some-
what in the foregoing order.
First: What were the interests of Minda Olufson? She had,
fist and clearly, a right to.receive income so long as she was mar-
ried to the person named. Was this (as to the real estate) "a
trust for the receipt of the rents and profits of the lands" under
section 8098? If so, it was non-assignable by virtue of that sec-
tion, but subject, in part, to the claims of creditors under section
8092. Neither section was referred to by counsel or the court.
If the restrictive definition of the Simmons Case were followed,
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the trust would not be within the sections, and this may be the
reason that they were not referred to. But if it was intended to
renew that definition (so much more restricted than the view of
the same section held in New York, where it originated), it would
have been comforting to know it. At least the new decision does
not overrule this portion of the Silnnons Case, and it may there-
fore still be said that a trust of real estate to pay income, or an
annuity from income, is in Minnesota probably governed by the
common law, and not by the two statutes.
(;ranting that Minda Olufson's interest in income was not
within the sections of the statutes, it was the sort of interest to
which, by the prevailing view in a majority of states, spendthrift
provisions might validly attach. The court says it is not a spend-
thrift trust (evidently having some other meaning of the phrase
in mind), but it relies upon the cases which sustain restraints on
reaching income, and its decision is that the interest in question
cannot be reached. The holding clearly is that restraints 6n
reaching income (and therefore also against assigning it) are
valid. Minnesota counsel from now on may confidently restrict
such interests against assignment by the beneficiary and against
attacks of creditors, and may omit with safety the further clauses
formerly in use, for forfeiture and the discretionary application
of income to support. This much the case does settle.
Returning to the interests of Minda Olufson, did she have
anything except the interest in income mentioned? Where was
the remainder? The will is far from clear, but the remainder is
apparently disposed of in her favor. The other daughters got
their thirds outright. No other recipient of hr one-third is
mentioned. The property is held "in trust for Mlinda Olufson."
If her husband dies before her (or if they are divorced), then the
trust ends, and apparently she tdkes the property. If she dies
before him it also terminates and (perhaps) her heirs or issue
take. The will was incomplete, but apparently she had at least a
contingent interest in the corpus of the trust as well as a vested
interest in income. To the extent that the remainder was not
disposed of in her favor, it was not disposed of at all, and there
was a partial intestacy. In that case also she takes one-third of
the undisposed remainder of one-third, as heir. In either case
she had an interest in corpus. -2 3
"3The court did not take this view. The opinion says (1930) 181
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The court held that the creditor took nothing. Upon the facts
as analyzed, this apparently would mean that even an interest in
principal can be placed beyond the reach of creditors. But the
case cannot be cited for that proposition. The opinion does say
ait one point that "during the existence, of this trust a creditor of
Minda Olufson cannot reach either the trust property or the in-
come therefrom."2 4  But thfe will was vague and incomplete, the
interest of Minda in the corpus was left to inference and was per-
haps contingent,-and the court was not convinced that she had any.
it is therefore still in doubt in Minnesota, whether a trust interest
in fee can be rendered non-assignable or placed beyond the reach
oif creditors. The rules elsewhere upon that point are stated in
Dean Fraser's papers, and in the Restatement..2 5
But the startling part of tle decision relates to our third ques-
tion. The court finds, from the language of the trust. that the
purpose of the donor was "to protect the income and the property
from the control of and acquisition by others, especially . . . her
husband," in other words, thit the testator intended to restrain
any transfer of her interesf by Minda, and to restrain her creditors
from reaching it. If this was his. intention, he took great pains
not to disclose it. All that he says is that there is to he a trust as
long as Minda is married to John Olufson, that while the trust
continues Minda is to have the income, that if Minda predeceases
John the property (perhaps) passes to her children, and that if
John predeceases Minda the trust is at an end, and the property
apparently) becomes Minda's absolutely. His language gives
i-one of the common indications that Minda must not transfer her
interest, or that it is exempt from creditors. He obviously did not
Minn. 289, 291, 232 N. W. 337:
"There is no provision in -the instrument creating the trust for the
transfer or passage of any title to the trust property to her. All she is
expressly given is the income therefrom."
It would be interesting to know what the court would do with a case
where, John Olufson having died, and the trust therefore having terminated,
Minda and someone else appeared as rival claimants for the property.24(1930) 181 Minn. 289, 294, 232 N. W. 337. American Law Insti-
tute, Restatement of the Law of Trusts, Tentative Draft No. 2, therefore,
cites the case as holding that the rights of creditors to reach an interest
in corpus can be postponed until the corpus is due to vest in possession.
American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Trusts, Tentative
Draft No. 2, sec. 149 and explanatory note.2r2Fraser, Rules against Restraints on Alienation, and against Suspen-
sion of the Absolute Power of Alienation in Minnesota, (1924) 8 .MIxNE-
soTA LAw REVIEw 185.. 187-194; American Law Institute, Restatement of
the Law of Trusts, Tentative Draft No. 2. sec. 147 and 149 and explanatory
notes.
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trust John Olufson, but there is no ind:catio:i that he distrusted
Minda. Oin the contrary, if she should survive her husband, the
trust is at an end and she (apparently) is to have the property out-
right. The creditor who sued was a creditor of Minda, and the
dec:sion gives no intimation that the obligation sued onl had any
connection with her husband. But the court finds, somewhere, an
intention to protect Minda's interest from everyone, and decides
accordingly.
It has already been suggested that when courts find restraints
i;tended ol such inconclusive language the real reason may be
that they have for the moment overlooked the first general propo-
sition, that such interests are assignable unless restrained. It is
believed this happened in the Ohlfson Case. The court says:2';
"To hold that cred:tors or others may now come in and take
away the income or the property will destroy the trust and defeat
the clear purpose of the donor. He says that this income is to be
paid by the trustee to his daughter. W\'e are asked to say that the
income shall be diverted and paid to her creditors."
In other words, any trust to pay income is a spendthrift trust.
It is this part of the decision that has most disturbed the bar.
The proposition that creditors can in no case reach the income
from a trust may be attractive to a cestui when he is attempting
to evade his obligations, but its necessary corollary, that the right
to income cannot be assigned, is not so pleasant when fo# any
reason he desires to sell, or give away, or borrow on his interest.
And if adopted fully such a rule creates, without necessity, a vast
new mortmain of great properties. valuable and varied, which
their owners cannot give away nor sell nor mortgage, which are
exempt from claims of creditors, and which are not available for
any of the purposes of commerce or of credit.
It will not do to assume that no one puts property in trust
except to "protect" the cestui from himself. Trusts are created
every day to keep property together to be managed, while dividing
up its benefits, or to permit life tenants and persons in remainder
in a fund consisting of securities. Persons leaving property in
trust, for the benefit of competent and adult beneficiaries, now
have the choice to leave their cestuis free to deal with their own
interests (which means that their creditors can also reach them)
or to protect those interests from creditors (which means that the
beneficiaries' own hands must be tied.) When the latter inten-
"(1930) 181 Minn. 289, 291, 232 N. W. 337.
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tion exists, it is only reasonable to require that it be stated. Oth-
ei wise it is imlpossible to say of any particular trust, without a
lawsuit, whether the beneficiary has power to deal with his interest
or not.
It is because it seems to overlook these last considerations that
the Olufson'decision has been so disturbing. It.is strongly to be
hoped that the court will have a chance to reconsider it. But
what is really needed is legislative action on the subject. The
present statutory sections are confusing in their language, the dis-
tinction which they make between income from real estate and
from securit.es is without reasonable basis at the present time,
and the vageness of the "surplus" provisions of section 8092 is
full of seeds of trouble. ' 7 But it will not do simply to repeal the
sections. \\e shall then have the common law distinction between
"trusts for supl)port'""- and trusts simply to pay income, which
are often, in the mind of their creator, two forms of the same
thing; and.under the Olufson decision we shall have spendthrift
trusts in unlimited amount. No court, committed to the principle
of spendthrift trusts, has-so far made a difference between an
income of five hundred dollars and one of fifty thousand, and it
is hard to see how a purely judicial consideration could do so; but
no one will dispute that, as a social policy, a difference of rule
would be appropriate.
It should be possible, to some extent, for donors to protect
their beneficiaries against their own unwisdom. There are de-
grees of competence in money matters, which testators can guess
at, but which the law can hardly ascertain or go by. Our l)resent
sections, authorizing what amount to spendthrift trusts in certain
cases and in limited amounts, contaii a germ of wisdom which
is worth preserving. But the idea should not devend upon the
form of property, should leave some leeway to the judgment of
the creator of the trust, and the ui)f)er limit should be definite.
And certain sorts of claimants should be able to reach any prop-
erty their debtors own.2 9
27See the New York cases referred to in Gray, Restraints on Aliena-
tion, 2nd ed.. Appendix I, secs. 290-294 d, and (1931) 15 MINNESOTA LAW
REVIEW 570, 573.
"
8See. American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Trusts,
Tentative Draft No. 2, sec. 150.
2 See Griswold, Reaching the Interest of the Beneficiary of a Spend-
thrift Trust, (1929) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 63; American Law Institute. Re-
statement of the Law of Trusts, Tentative Draft No. 2, sec. 153.
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To make these suggestions definite, the following legislative
action is proposed:
1. Repeal Mason's Statutes, 1927, sections 8098 and 8092.
2. Enact two new sections, to read substantially as follows:
"Sec. - . The right to receive income or principal (or a
share of either or a payment out of either) from any private trust
is, in general, subject both to voluntary and involuntary transfer.
But the creator of the trust may (by appropriate language in the
trust instrument and not otherwise) provide that the interest of a
certain beneficiary (or class of beneficiaries), in income (but not
in principal)- ° shall not be subject to voluntary transfer, and such
provis~on Nt-hen made shall be effective. When and to the extent
that such provision is made the creator of the trust (when it is
created without consideration) 3 may (by provision in the instru-
ment and not otherwise) further provide that the same interest or
interests (being owned wholly by others than himself)3 ' shall not
be subject to be reached by the creditors of the beneficiary in ques-
tion, and such provision when made in such case shall be valid, ex-
cept to the extent provided in the next section."
"Sec. - . Notwithstanding such provisions, the interest of
the beneficiary can be reached (by garnishment or execution
served on the trustee) in satisfaction of a claim (otherwise en-
forcible) against the beneficiary in any of the following cases:
1 ) By the wife or child of the beneficiary for support;
12) For necessary services rendered to the beneficiary or
necessary supplies furnished to him;
(3) For services rendered and materials furnished which
preserve or benefit the interest of the beneficiary ;33
(4) When the income payable to the beneficiary in any cal-
endar year exceeds $2,000.00, then by any creditor of the bene-
ficiarv to the extent of such excess.."
34
30Or "(and in principal)" as is decided to be the better policy. See
Fraser, Rules against Restraints on Alienation, and against Suspension of
the Absolute Power of Alienation in Minnesota, (1924) 8 MININESoTA LAW
RrvIEw 187, 192-194.31See Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts Created for the Settlor, (1930) 44
Harv. L. Rev., 203, 213-218.
'"
2See Griswold. Spendthrift Trusts Created for the Settlor, (1930)
44 Harv. L. Rev., 203, 205-213; American Law Institute, Restatement of
the Law of Trusts, Tentative Draft No. 2, sec. 152.
13 These exceptions are generally admitted in states that otherwise
approve spendthrift clauses. See the authorities in footnote 29. The ques-
tion ifhether alimony claims (see Erickson v. Erickson, (1930) 181 Minn.
421. 423. 232 N.W. 793) and claims for torts should be included should
also be considered.
-"This clause adopts a general idea now expressed in other form in
the statutes of three states. North Carolina, Code 1927, sec. 1742; Virginia,
Code 1930, sec. 5157; New Jersey Comp. Stats. Cum. Supp. 1924, sec. 71-91.
If the transfer of interests in principal is permitted to be tied up (see foot-
note 30). then an anoropriate limitation as to amount of principal should
also be included in this section.
